Are Equity Mutual Funds Really “Burning Through Cash”?

March 8th, 2010

A recent Bloomberg article titled S&P Rally Slowed by Fastest Cash Depletion Since 1991 talked about how the amount of cash in equity mutual funds “dropped to 3.6 percent of assets from 5.7 percent in January 2009, leaving managers with $172 billion in the quickest decrease since 1991″.

That headline caught my eye, because I keep close tabs on that data, and while I was well aware that the percentage was declining, I was not aware that the actual amount of cash was declining at such a fast pace.  So I decided to do a little simple math.

I am going to start from the end of February 2009, when the liquid asset ratio (the percent of assets invested in cash and cash equivalents) was at 5.7%, the same as it was the month before in January 2009.  At the end of February 2009, the total assets in stock funds equaled $3,104,921.3 million (a little over $3.1 trillion).  Multiplying the assets by the percentage gives us the liquid assets total of $176,980.5 million (nearly $177 billion).

Fast forward to the end of January 2010.  Cash now only comprises 3.6% of the assets.  Total assets were $4,776,900 million (nearly $4.8 trillion).  Multiplying the two, we find that cash is now $171,968.4 million (nearly $172 billion).

The difference in cash amounts … the gigantic pile of cash that these fund managers have allegedly “burned through”   … comes to a mere $5 billion!

Nearly everybody reading this now knows what happened.  The cash pile didn’t shrink by a significant amount.  What happened is that the other assets rose by a significant amount.  The rising stock prices meant that the level of cash, which was relatively steady over the time frame, became a smaller and smaller percentage of the assets.

Here’s another way of looking at it.  If stocks had not gone up, then the $5 billion decline in cash would have caused the cash-to-assets ratio to go from 5.70% to 5.53%.  Is that news?

The punch line is that the percentage of cash did indeed fall at one of the swiftest rates in history.  Well, think about what the market did the past year.  It rose so fast that the stock portion of mutual funds rose at one of the fastest rates in history.  Consequently, the news of the rapidly falling liquid asset ratio is nothing more than a function of the size of the market’s rally!

Just to be clear, I am NOT saying that this is bullish.  The fact is that the last time the liquid asset ratio was down at this level, the market did indeed embark on the catastrophic bear market.  I’m just pointing out that the reason the liquid asset ratio fell has less to do with mutual funds “burning through cash” and more to do with the market’s rally.

– Don

Is Mark-to-Make-Believe About to Get a Reality Check?

March 8th, 2010

One of the key changes made last year to alleviate the financial crisis was the elimination of mark-to-market of illiquid securities that banks typically traded.  If you were a bank holding an illiquid security and it resembled something similar to what was being sold by a failing bank at an extremely low price in a panic situation, you had to mark your portfolio to that panic-driven low price.  The reason was that in most circumstances, the banks had no intention of holding those securities to maturity.  They wanted to unload them as soon as possible, sometimes to an SIV, other times to investors.

What happened, however, is that once the price reached a certain low level, many banks decided to hold these losers instead of selling them.  Regulators then changed the rule so that banks were allowed to use models to come up with valuations, instead of having to mark their price according to what was actually happening in the market.

The belief was that, if the banks didn’t have to write down these securities, they could then take the capital that was no longer tied to those paper losses, and instead apply it towards profit-making investments such as new loans.  Then, when it finally came time to realize the losses on the underwater securities, the profits from the new ventures would be sufficient to pay off the losses from all those bad old loans.

The change was a godsend to troubled financial institutions, because it delayed the day of reckoning till a time when they would … hopefully … be in a position to handle the losses.

Well, it looks like, at least in the commercial real estate market, some of delays are coming home to roost before the banks had expected, which is why this story is so relevant: ‘On the Edge’ Banks Facing Writedowns After FDIC Loan Auctions.  It’s a story about some loans the FDIC ended up with from a failed bank it took over.  Here are two key paragraphs:

If the loan is sold to a buyer who restructures it at less than book value or forecloses on the property, participating banks would have to write down their stakes, said Russell Mallett, a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in New York who specializes in bank accounting. Absent a restructuring, banks have flexibility in how they value loans, he said.

“This is a situation the FDIC is going to face more, since the number of bank failures is going up,” said Gerard Cassidy, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets in Portland, Maine. “The FDIC is not in the business of managing loans, so they do have to sell them. But they also have to look at the bigger picture and take a global approach by liquidating those assets without hurting the banks that bought participations.”

It looks like mark-to-make-believe in the commercial real estate market is about to get a reality check sooner than people expected.

– Don

Can Two People Look At The Same Stat And Come To Opposite Conclusions And Both Be Right?

February 25th, 2010

I thought this was interesting.  Two very bright market analysts look at the same data, and come to, what seems like two different conclusions:

What Happens When Consumer Confidence Falls 10-Points?

It’s darkest before the dawn

The former looks at the data and warns us that “Stock market performance following these drops are usually poor”.  The latter looks at the data and says that, “… in all cases, the stock market at such times represented very attractive long-term values.”

The difference is the time frame of the period following the big drop in consumer confidence.  In one case, the measuring period is one month.  The other time frame is much longer — months, even years.

– Don